The Profanation of the Sacred
Iran: a geopolitical anomaly in its most delicate phase
There is a simple way to approach contemporary Iran without getting lost in details: count and compare.
From 1979 to 2026, Tehran has had only two Supreme Leaders: Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei. Two names across nearly half a century.
During the same period, the United States went through nine presidents: from Jimmy Carter to Donald Trump, passing through Ronald Reagan, Bush father and son, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and Joe Biden.
In Moscow, leadership moved from Brezhnev to the collapse of the USSR, then Yeltsin and, for the past 26 years, Vladimir Putin.
In Beijing, four generations of leadership succeeded one another: from Deng Xiaoping to the Jiang Zemin phase, Hu Jintao and the era of Xi Jinping. Changes at the top paced within the complex organization that claims continuity more than any other in the world, the Chinese Communist Party.
In 1979, the European Economic Community consisted of nine member states. Today the European Union counts twenty-seven.
Two ayatollahs against a whirlwind of names.
Two against institutional transformations, enlargements, empire collapses, reunifications, withdrawals.
Today that count has stopped. And it will have to begin again.
With Khamenei’s death, Iran enters its first real leadership transition in thirty-six years.
The geopolitical anomaly that ensured strategic stability is now a vast question mark.
Not just another regime
The Islamic Republic is not simply one authoritarian state among many. It is something more peculiar: a modern, industrial nation, with universities, missiles, intelligence services and global diplomacy, that formally and legally recognizes the political supremacy of a theologian.
This is not symbolism. Not theory. It is concrete constitutional architecture.
The principle of Velayat-e Faqih, the rule of the Islamic jurist elaborated by Khomeini, establishes that the final word belongs to a religious authority.
Not to a general. Not to a king. Not to a party. Certainly not to the people. The final word belongs to a cleric.
In the contemporary world, on this scale, it is a unique case.
And this is precisely what makes the succession after the killing of Khamenei a systemic and potentially seismic event, not an ordinary rotation of leadership.
The forgotten history
Iran is often imagined as a country that has merely prolonged ancient traditions into the present. That is not the case.
Under the Pahlavi dynasty, from 1925 to 1979, Iran undertook a forced modernization: civil codes replaced religious law, education was taken from the clergy, women were granted the vote, and the country opened toward the West.
This was not an anomaly in the twentieth-century Islamic world. On the contrary, Iran moved in the same direction as Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt or Iraq: authoritarian modernization, state centralization, marginalization of the clergy.
An authoritarian path, but toward secularism.
The revolution of 1979 was a clean rupture. A U-turn.
Where many Islamic states had subordinated religion to politics, Tehran did the opposite: it subordinated politics to religion.
It is not medieval survival. It is inverted modernity.
Western and other parallels
To find political structures comparable to today’s Iran, one must look back to the Papal States. It is the most solid comparison.
During the Renaissance and the Counter-Reformation, the Pope was an absolute sovereign. He managed finances, armies and diplomacy, acting as a major regional power.
His authority, like that of the Supreme Leader, was not subject to debate, since it derived from the divine. It still does today, obviously on a very different scale.
Less known but structurally similar were the Prince-Bishops until the Napoleonic reform of 1803, particularly the Archbishop of Mainz, effectively Chancellor for Germany.
Other contemporary cases often mentioned show substantial differences: Nepal until 2008 was the only Hindu kingdom in the world, with the King considered an incarnation of the divine.
The monarchy was then abolished and the country is now a secular federal republic.
In Myanmar, despite the enormous political influence of Buddhist monks, power has historically rested with a secular military junta, the Tatmadaw. There is no structure in which a religious leader formally serves as Head of State.
But aren’t all Arabs the same
No.
First of all, Iranians are not Arabs. They are largely Persian, historically heirs to one of the oldest known civilizations in the world.
With various other ethnic components, in any case Indo-European, descending from tribes that migrated from Central Asia in the second millennium BCE.
Arabs are a Semitic people, originating in the Arabian Peninsula.
Iranians are also Shi’a Muslims, different in confession and often in tension with Sunnis, who represent the vast majority of Muslims, including most Arabs.
In the Sunni world, historically there is no organized clerical hierarchy comparable to the Catholic Church or to the Shi’a clergy.
For a Sunni, the leader, the Caliph, is a political-military chief who protects the faith, not necessarily a theologian issuing divine law.
For this reason, in the Sunni world dynastic monarchies or political-military leaderships have historically prevailed, not Supreme Leaders in turbans.
Saudi Arabia is ultra-conservative, yes, but it remains a hereditary monarchy. The Saud family rules; the clergy legitimizes. If the prince decides on a reform, the system adjusts.
Algeria and Egypt are military-led regimes, often engaged in containing political Islam rather than exalting it. The dynamic is the reverse of Tehran’s.
The only partial parallel remains Taliban Afghanistan. But there the structure is rudimentary, tribal.
Iran is a theocracy with ministries, a missile industry, refined negotiators and a ruling class educated in modern universities. A president and a parliament exist, but under a religious umbrella that can block, direct, correct.
It is not religion serving the throne. It is politics serving the ayatollah’s interpretation.
It is an institutionalized theocracy.
The long breath of dogma
Two Supreme Leaders in nearly half a century. Rare strategic continuity.
While democracies oscillate every four or five years, Tehran has been able to plan across decades.
But this strength contains an evident fragility: symbolic and legal dependence on a single figure.
That fragility has now become reality.
Khamenei’s death opens a phase in which the entire system must prove it can survive its own principle of personalized power.
After Khamenei: four scenarios
The Constitution entrusts the choice of the new Leader to the Assembly of Experts. But the real balance of power lies between the clergy and the Revolutionary Guards.
The succession does not unfold in a strategic vacuum, but in a region marked by permanent conflicts and direct confrontation with Israel and the United States.
1. Controlled continuity
The most probable scenario. An internal, reliable figure, chosen rapidly, likely already prepared as heir. Reinforcement of the security apparatus. Continuity on the nuclear file and regional policy.
The objective would be clear: to show that, despite everything, nothing cracks.
2. Hardening
The forced and violent transition, the profanation of the Sacred, may become an opportunity to consolidate.
More internal control. Greater external assertiveness, a louder voice toward the rest of the world.
Succession transformed into a moment of ideological mobilization.
3. Progressive militarization
Formally a religious Leader. Substantially a system increasingly influenced by the Pasdaran, the armed guardians of the Revolution.
The theocracy would evolve toward a more securitized than clerical form, with probable dictatorial development.
4. Recalibration phase
The least immediate but not impossible hypothesis.
A less charismatic leadership could open spaces for adjustment: reduced social rigidity, attempts to ease economic isolation, renegotiation of internal balances.
It would not be a secular revolution. It would be adaptation.
The anomaly tested
So far Iran has demonstrated that a contemporary theocracy can endure. It remains the only major international actor claiming that political legitimacy must derive directly from the sacred.
Its peculiarity lies not only in faith, but in having subordinated an industrialized nation to a doctrine that transforms political time into theological time, immobile and resistant to the rhythms of contemporary history.
Will it withstand its own profanation?
