How many?
In an age when you can count your daily steps, someone has decided you may no longer count the dead
This war wears two watches, and they tell different hours.
One says four years and counting. It began in February 2022, when the Russian tanks crossed the border while the cameras framed them; it is the watch the news runs on.
The other says twelve. It began in 2014, on the sly, in Crimea and the eastern provinces, in a war that did not yet call itself a war. By this watch it is the longest war fought on European soil since Napoleon, 1803-1815.
Almost everyone sees only the first watch.
That is no accident. The gap between four and twelve is the first thing worth pausing on, because it is not made of time. It is made of attention. And attention, in our century, is the most contested territory of all.
There is a war of tanks and of dead, and as far as we are able, we know it is there.
But alongside it another is being fought, made of what we are allowed to know and what is kept from us.
It is this second war these lines are about. It does not let itself be photographed, because its weapons are not tanks: they are satellites, social platforms, algorithms, and numbers that never add up.
And yet it is the same war, simply seen from the other side.
To tell it to a child or to a grandmother, it helps to start where they already are: in front of a screen.
The war that learned to disappear
A war this large does not vanish because something suddenly stops happening. It vanishes because someone makes something else happen, to hide it.
The method is tried and tested, and for the war we are discussing it has a precise moment.
September 2015: the fighting in eastern Ukraine is bogged down, a stalemate; the Russian president climbs to the podium of the United Nations to speak of peace. He says it would be an enormous mistake not to join him against terrorism, that he only wants to lend a hand in saving the world.[1]
Two days later, Russian planes are bombing Syria.[2] More than one Western official points out that those raids are not hitting the terrorists the speech had named at all; one, near Homs, has no military sense whatsoever.[3]
Peace was the label. The bombs were the substance. And the smoke does its second job: to wrench the world’s gaze away from a war it could not win and onto a new one, louder, more useful to propaganda.
The move repeats over the years, in Syria and under other names.
Gaza. Iran.
Every fire is real, it produces tragedy and dead; every fire is also a place to send the eye, as long as it is not Ukraine. The most faithful ally of autocracy is our short memory, the habit of treating the world’s crises as if they happened one at a time, forgetting yesterday’s the moment today’s is more broadcast.
But the most ingenious weapon was never the bombs.
The people
Take the Belarusian border. Starting in 2021, thousands of Iraqi and Kurdish migrants are lured to Minsk, Moscow’s iron ally, on tourist visas and the false promise of an easy way into Europe; then put on buses and dumped at the Polish and Lithuanian frontiers.[4]
The Polish prime minister says it without mincing words: this is not a migration crisis, it is a political crisis engineered to destabilize the European Union.[5]
And the moment chosen is no coincidence. The push comes in the months preparing the full-scale invasion of February 2022: it serves to measure the alliance’s reflexes, to see how long a line will hold.
Poland moves fifteen thousand soldiers to the border, pulling them from other duties.[6]
But the same flow serves another purpose too. After the invasion, Russian intelligence recruits refugees who had reached Poland: it uses them to plant hidden cameras at railway hubs and to map the routes of military aid heading into Ukraine.[7]
The people pushed to crowd the border were also, in part, made to watch it.
The overall cost of refugees to the European Union in the 2022-2025 period comes to 36.4 billion euros.[8] Human beings used as pawns, to clog the board and wear down the adversary, by a state that takes in no human beings of its own.
And the uprooting does a third job, the cruelest and the most cunning.
It does not only wear Europe down.
It feeds the politics that wants to tear it apart.
Migratory tension is fuel for the movements of the wall and the barbed wire, for those hyper-nationalist and far-right currents that a certain kind of long-range geopolitical strategy has cultivated for years.
The refugee becomes an argument. The argument becomes a vote. The vote becomes a crack, and Brexit is the most evident of those cracks, in Europe.
It is a clockwork mechanism: whoever produces the flow also collects the political returns of the outrage shouted against the flow, an outrage that creates money and easy jobs for as long as the problem stays unsolved, and that therefore does everything except solve it.
And that reaction weakens the very European Union that stands against that power.
The hand that lights the fire also profits from the extinguisher, which does not work.
The oldest game in the world, with new pieces
None of this is new. Only the tools are new.
The Middle East and Eastern Europe, two separate theaters competing for a spot on the front page? They never were. For most of the last century they have been the two sides of the same chessboard.
For the whole length of the Cold War, Moscow and its bloc back the Arab front against Israel, in the wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, with money, weapons, propaganda.[9]
The West keeps Israel on its own side. The United States most of all.
Meanwhile the Western left, communist and socialist, by reflex of that same rivalry, looks to Moscow and therefore to the Palestinian cause. The alignments harden into instinct and sentiment, reason lost behind impulse.
At the start it was the opposite.
In 1947 and 1948 a coincidence of interests puts the Soviet Union and the Jewish community of Palestine on the same side; Moscow even lets Czechoslovakia sell the weapons that will prove decisive for the young Israeli forces.[10]
Israel was nearly a Soviet creature before becoming an American one.
The alignments were never carved in stone. They were positions of convenience, and the Soviet embrace of the Arab world was calculation more than faith: a way of standing wherever the Americans did not.[11]
That thread has never snapped, and it reaches all the way to today. Moscow has never placed Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations, unlike the United States, the European Union, and most of the West.
In 2006 Putin was among the first leaders in the world to congratulate it on its electoral victory, and the following year he was hosting its leader in Moscow.
After the massacre of 7 October 2023, while almost every government condemned the attack, the Kremlin refused to, and less than three weeks later it received a Hamas delegation at the palace.[12]
There is no need to imagine a plot, and there is no proof of one: Moscow had no need to organize anything. It was enough that one square caught fire for the West’s eye to turn that way, leaving the other, Kyiv, to slip into the dark.[12]
Why should a chessboard a century old matter to a war happening now?
Because today’s fronts are not separate.
There is a player to whom it is very convenient that the West’s public eye be pulled off Kyiv and fixed on Gaza or Iran.
That one war should mediatically cover another is not a whim of the news cycle.
It is the chessboard working exactly as it was designed.
Who owns the wires
And here we come to the heart of it. To understand this war you must not ask who has more soldiers. You must ask who owns the wires.
A modern war runs through infrastructure: the networks that carry the orders, guide the drones, send the images home.
In this war, much of that infrastructure belongs to a single private company, and in practice to a single man.
In February 2022, in the first hours of the full-scale invasion, Russia knocks out Ukraine’s communication networks. Stepping in to replace them is Starlink, a constellation of satellites owned by a single American company, which gives Ukraine back the connection it had lost.
Ukraine’s digital minister will say that without Starlink the country’s entire communication system would not stand.[13]
Let us stop and consider this: the crutch was on loan. And the one who lent it had his moods.
When Ukraine asks to extend the network in order to strike Russian ships in occupied Crimea, the owner refuses to enable it: he fears, personally, that it might trigger a nuclear reprisal.[13]
A private citizen, on a strictly personal consideration, makes a decision that would belong to states.
The wires have become a leash, in the hand of a single person.
And it is no temporary tether: that one company’s satellites are now about two-thirds of everything humanity has put into orbit, over ten thousand of them; the nearest rival, with a few hundred, does not reach five percent.[14]
Even the United States, the greatest military power on the planet, depends on this private actor: the Pentagon is a customer of Starlink, a supplier it cannot fully control.
What is more, the companies that carry the war are the same ones that let us see it.
Whoever owns the wires owns also the images that pass through them.
And when the infrastructure a war is fought with is also the one through which it is seen, the owner of the channel is not reporting the war. He is inside the war.
He can decide, by accident or by mood or by contract, what to light up and what not.
And here we are at the dark.
The number nobody has
The simplest question that can be put to a war.
How many are the dead?
We cannot answer. Not precisely, not even roughly. And not because we lack the means to count, but because being counted suits no one who holds power.
Let us look at the spread. As for its own fallen, the Russian state has simply stopped counting in public: the last official tally of its military dead dates to September 2022, six months into the invasion, and speaks of a little under six thousand killed.[15]
Since then it has not been updated. Not because the war ended there, but because to keep counting out loud would mean admitting how many are dying.
Western and independent estimates speak of an entirely different scale: the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington reckons three hundred and twenty-five thousand dead and a total nearing one million two hundred thousand in dead, wounded, and missing, by the end of 2025.[16]
Six thousand admitted against three hundred and twenty-five thousand estimated.
This is not the “fog of war”. It is dark manufactured at a desk, and the journalists who tried to count inside Russia have been silenced.[16]
Nor is the other side transparent, only less brazen.
The Ukrainian president has publicly stated fifty-five thousand soldiers killed.[17] The independent analyses of the weekly The Economist, based on satellite imagery and open sources, speak of a figure between sixty and a hundred thousand dead; the same Center for Strategic and International Studies goes up to a hundred and forty thousand.[17]
Here the official figure and the highest estimate differ by nearly threefold, on the most elementary fact there is. Ukraine keeps much of those numbers under secret, and says so openly, for military reasons.[17]
When you move to the total of dead, wounded, and missing, the casualties, the same Center for Strategic and International Studies places Ukrainian losses between five and six hundred thousand.[18] And the United Nations, counting only the civilians it can verify one by one, has reached about fourteen thousand confirmed dead, and in the same breath warns that the real number is surely far higher, because the fallen in occupied and active combat zones cannot be confirmed.[19]
Let us set all this beside our own lives. The phone counts our steps one by one. It knows the heartbeat, the hours of sleep, the minutes spent at the wheel, whether we turned left or right.
We have built a civilization able to count almost everything about a single ordinary person. And it hides from us how many human beings have died in the largest war in Europe in generations.
It is not a failure of technology. The satellites are up there. The drones film everything. The phones are in every pocket. The dark is not a gap in the tools.
It is a decision made about the tools.
A dead person who cannot be catalogued cannot be mourned at scale, cannot become a figure that triggers accountability.
And so he is not counted.
He does not count.
Opacity is not an accident: it is the policy.
Into that dark, now, something new is pouring. Artificial intelligence does not thin the fog: it makes more of it. Images of things that never happened. Testimonies from people who do not exist. Whole stories generated faster than any human can verify, until the channel is so clogged that what drowns is the truth itself.
The old censorship hid the truth. The new method does worse: it churns out so many competing truths that even the habit of asking “is this true?” begins to seem naive, tiring, pointless.
A people that no longer cares to tell true from false is easier to govern than a people that has merely been lied to, because it has stopped expecting an answer.
The laboratory
Let us go back for a moment to the silenced watch, no sound, no notifications, no vibration.
Let us go back to 2014.
It is right not to call it a full-blown war, that first phase: it wore a disguise, soldiers without insignia, denials, a fog of “we are not there” while plainly being there.
But it is precisely the disguise that makes it decisive.
2014 was not only the start of the shooting. It was, above all, the laboratory of the information war. It was there that the tools were tested: the operation that can always be denied, the comments drowned in noise, the doubt built to order, the narrative engineered to make a clear thing murky.
What in 2014 began to be tested quietly was then unleashed at full scale after 2022, and not only on the field. It was unleashed on us, on our screens, on our capacity to know anything at all.
The war of bullets and the war of seeing were born in the same place.
But we saw only one of them.
What remains
Two watches, then. One says the war is four years old. The other says twelve.
Both are running, and both will keep running, because neither the ending nor the count suits those who hold the power to decide today.
The war has not been closed. The dead have not been counted.
A war you cannot see clearly is a war that can go on without you: paid for with your taxes, fought in your name, and yet kept at the margin of your attention, where it need not count.
So the question is not who is winning. It is older: the one the phone can answer about your steps, and that no one will answer about the dead.
How many?
When the most powerful instruments ever built by man are used on purpose to obscure, the failure is not technical.
It is a choice someone made about what you are allowed to know.
The first step in not accepting it is small, and it is yours alone: to keep asking the question even after you have been taught that to ask it is naive.
How many?
Notes
[1] Putin, address to the UN General Assembly, 28 September 2015 (CNBC; Washington Post transcript).
[2] NPR, “Russia Begins Airstrikes In Syria,” 30 September 2015.
[3] GlobalSecurity.org, “Russian Air Campaign 2015”; The Conversation, “Why Putin gambled on airstrikes in Syria.”
[4] Foreign Affairs, “How Migrants Got Weaponized,” 2023; Foreign Policy, “How Russia and Belarus Weaponized Migration,” 2021.
[5] Statement of Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki, November 2021.
[6] Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Weaponized Mass Migration,” February 2026.
[7] Jamestown Foundation, “Russian Intelligence Recruits Refugees and Migrants in NATO Countries for Espionage,” July 2025.
[8] Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Weaponized Mass Migration,” February 2026 (overall cost of refugees to the EU, 2022-2025).
[9] Carnegie Endowment, “Israel-Russia Relations.”
[10] Lebanese Army official site, “The Israeli-Soviet/Russian Relations”; PalQuest, “The USSR and the Palestine Question.”
[11] Central College, “Soviet Foreign Policy with Israel.”
[12] INSS, “Russia-Hamas Relations and the Israel-Hamas War,” November 2023; Carnegie Endowment, “Why Russia and Hamas Are Growing Closer,” 2023; Washington Institute, “Russia’s Relationship with Hamas and Putin’s Global Calculations,” November 2023.
[13] Irregular Warfare Initiative, “When a CEO Plays President: Musk, Starlink, and the War in Ukraine”; PBS NewsHour, on Musk’s refusal to enable Starlink for the Sevastopol attack (September 2022 episode); biographer Walter Isaacson’s clarification that coverage was not active in the area.
[14] Orbital Radar and The Global Statistics, satellite-operator trackers, 2026 (Starlink c. 65-69% of active satellites, over 10,000; nearest rival OneWeb c. 650, under 5%).
[15] WarDeathData, “Russia-Ukraine War Death Toll 2026”; The Moscow Times (Russian official tally frozen at September 2022, just under 6,000 killed, regarded as a severe undercount).
[16] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine,” January 2026 (c. 325,000 dead and c. 1.2 million in dead, wounded, and missing); Al Jazeera, “The Ukraine war in numbers,” February 2026.
[17] Statement of President Zelensky, February 2026 (55,000 dead); The Economist, 2025-2026 estimate (60,000-100,000 dead); Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2026 (up to 140,000 dead).
[18] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine,” January 2026 (500,000-600,000 total Ukrainian losses: dead, wounded, missing).
[19] UN OHCHR, civilian casualties verified to 31 March 2026 (c. 13,900 confirmed dead), via Statista and factually.co.
